Решения Европейского Суда по делам
против России
На русском
FIRST SECTION
CASE OF
ROSELTRANS v. RUSSIA
(Application no. 60974/00)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
21 July 2005
This
judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44 § 2 of the
Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision.
In the case of Roseltrans v.
Russia,
The European Court of Human Rights (First Section),
sitting as a Chamber composed of:
Mr C.L.
Rozakis,
President,
Mr L.
Loucaides,
Mrs F.
Tulkens,
Mr P.
Lorenzen,
Mrs N.
Vajić,
Mrs S.
Botoucharova,
Mr A.
Kovler,
judges,
and Mr S.
Quesada,
Deputy Section
Registrar,
Having deliberated in private on 30 June 2005,
Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on
that date:
PROCEDURE
1. The case originated in an application (no. 60974/00)
against the Russian Federation lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the
Convention”) by
Rossiyskiy Electrotransport, also known as
Roseltrans, a Russian open joint-stock company (“the applicant company”), on
14 August 2000.
2. The applicant company was represented by Mr A.A.
Pavlov, a lawyer practising in Moscow. The Russian Government (“the Government”)
were represented by Mr P.A. Laptev, Representative of the Russian Federation at
the European Court of Human Rights.
3. The applicant company alleged, in particular, that a
judgment in its favour was quashed in supervisory review proceedings, in breach
of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.
4. The application was allocated to the First Section of
the Court (Rule 52 § 1 of the Rules of Court). Within that Section, the Chamber
that would consider the case (Article 27 § 1 of the Convention) was constituted
as provided in Rule 26 § 1.
5. By a decision of 27 May 2004, the Court declared the
application partly admissible.
6. The applicant company and the Government each filed
observations on the merits (Rule 59 § 1). The Chamber having decided, after
consulting the parties, that no hearing on the merits was required (Rule 59 § 3
in fine), the
parties replied in writing to each other's observations.
7. On 1 November 2004 the Court changed the composition
of its Sections (Rule 25 § 1). This case was assigned to the newly composed
First Section (Rule 52 § 1).
THE FACTS
I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
8. The applicant is a Russian open joint-stock company
which was set up in Moscow in 1994 by the Federal Ministry of State Property
Management (“the Ministry”) in pursuance of a directive from the President of
Russia and a Government decree. Its purpose was to hold shares of former state
enterprises which produced electrical equipment for the railways. The applicant
company's initial capital was formed by State property. Various individuals and
private companies also became shareholders at a subsequent point.
9. On 14 November 1995, following a directive to that
effect by the President of Russia, the Ministry adopted a resolution by which
the applicant company was liquidated and a liquidation committee was appointed.
10. The applicant company, represented by its director
general, joined proceedings brought by one of its minority shareholders before
the Lyublinskiy District Court of Moscow seeking to have the Ministry's
resolution of 14 November 1995 and a number of follow-up resolutions declared
void.
11. The applicant company asked the District Court to
issue an interim injunction prohibiting liquidation pending a trial and to strip
the liquidation committee of its powers. On 29 October 1998 the District Court
issued the injunction. It also prohibited the liquidation committee from acting
on behalf of the applicant company in legal proceedings.
12. On 17 May 2000 the District Court found in favour of
the applicant company and its co-plaintiffs. The court noted that the decision
to liquidate the applicant company was one that could be taken only by a general
assembly of its shareholders. The Ministry held less than 50% of the applicant
company's shares at the material time, and its decision to liquidate the
applicant company ran counter to the law. The court held that the resolution of
14 November 1995 and the follow-up resolutions were void and ordered the
Ministry to annul them. The Ministry did not appeal and the judgment came into
force on 28 May 2000.
13. Some time later the Ministry successfully applied
for intervention in the proceedings by the Moscow public prosecutor. On 10 April
2001 the prosecutor lodged an application for supervisory review (протест
в порядке надзора) of the judgment of 17 May 2000, seeking to have it set
aside.
14. On 10 May 2001, further to the prosecutor's request,
the Presidium of the Moscow City Court, which was composed of five judges,
reviewed the case. The court heard submissions from the acting public prosecutor
of Moscow, who supported the request. The applicant company did not attend the
hearing as it had not been informed that it was to be held.
15. Referring to the outcome of other proceedings
before different courts in 1997-1999, the Presidium of the Moscow City Court
stated that the Ministry had been the sole shareholder of the applicant company
at the material time. It was thus empowered to take a decision on liquidating
the applicant company in accordance with the relevant substantive law. The
director general had no authority to bring proceedings on behalf of the
applicant company, since his authority had been ended by the ministerial
resolutions in dispute. The District Court should have ensured that the
liquidation committee took part in the proceedings. Its failure to do so had
made it impossible to establish all the facts which were relevant for the proper
examination of the case.
16. The Presidium of the Moscow City Court granted the
prosecutor's request, quashed the judgment of 17 May 2000 and ordered a fresh
examination of the case by the Lyublinskiy District Court, with a different
composition.
17. The applicant company was not served with either a
copy of the prosecutor's request or a copy of the decision of 10 May 2001. It
learned of those developments in October 2001.
18. Following jurisdictional changes the case was
transferred to the Commercial Court of Moscow, which examined it on 25 March
2003. That court held that the fact that the proceedings had been brought by the
applicant company, in the person of its director general, was consistent with
the applicant company's regulations. The director general had never been
relieved of his post through an established procedure. The dispute originated in
the liquidation of the applicant company and concerned,
inter alia,
the lawfulness of the liquidation committee's appointment. That being the case,
the applicant company could not be deprived of its right to a court and its
action ought to be examined. The court further held that the Ministry had not
been the sole shareholder of the applicant company and that it had had no
authority under the legislation to liquidate the applicant company unilaterally.
19. By a decision of 25 March 2003, the Commercial Court
of Moscow found for the applicant company and its co-plaintiffs. It declared
void the resolution of 14 November 1995 and the follow-up resolutions and
ordered the Ministry to annul them. The Ministry did not appeal and the judgment
entered into force on 25 April 2003.
II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW
20. The Court's judgment in the case of
Ryabykh v. Russia
contains the following description of the relevant domestic law concerning
supervisory review proceedings, which also applied in the present case (see
Ryabykh v. Russia,
no. 52854/99, §§ 31-42, ECHR 2003-IX):
“Under the 1964 Code of Civil Procedure, which was in
force at the material time, judgments became final as follows:
Article 208
Coming into force of judgments
'Court judgments shall become legally binding on the
expiration of the time-limit for lodging a cassation appeal if no such appeal
has been lodged. If the judgment is not quashed following a cassation appeal, it
shall become legally binding when the higher court delivers its decision. ...'
The only further means of recourse was the special
supervisory review procedure that enabled courts to reopen final judgments
(пересмотр в порядке судебного надзора):
Article 319
Judgments, decisions and rulings amenable to supervisory review
'Final judgments, decisions and rulings of all Russian
courts shall be amenable to supervisory review on an application lodged by the
officials listed in Article 320 of the Code.'
The power of officials to lodge an application (протест)
depended on their rank and territorial jurisdiction:
Article 320
Officials who may initiate supervisory review
'Applications may be lodged by:
(1) the Prosecutor General – against judgments,
decisions and rulings of any court;
(2) the President of the Supreme Court – against
rulings of the Presidium of the Supreme Court and judgments and decisions of the
Civil Division of the Supreme Court acting as a court of first instance;
(3) Deputy Prosecutors General – against
judgments, decisions and rulings of any court other than rulings of the
Presidium of the Supreme Court;
(4) Vice-Presidents of the Supreme Court –
against judgments and decisions of the Civil Division of the Supreme Court
acting as a court of first instance;
(5) the Prosecutor General, Deputy Prosecutor
General, the President and Vice-Presidents of the Supreme Court – against
judgments, decisions and rulings of any court other than rulings of the
Presidium of the Supreme Court;
(6) the President of the Supreme Court of an
autonomous republic, a regional court, a city court, a court of an autonomous
region or a court of an autonomous district, the public prosecutor of an
autonomous republic, a region, a city, an autonomous region or an autonomous
district – against judgments and decisions of district (city) people's courts
and against decisions of civil divisions of, respectively, the Supreme Court of
an autonomous republic, regional court, city court, court of an autonomous
region or court of an autonomous district that examined the case on appeal.'
The power to lodge such applications was discretionary,
that is to say it was solely for the official concerned to decide whether or not
a particular case warranted supervisory review.
Under Article 322 officials listed in Article 320 who
considered that a case deserved closer examination could, in certain
circumstances, obtain the case file in order to establish whether good grounds
for lodging an application existed.
Article 323 of the Code empowered the relevant officials
to stay the execution of the judgment, decision or ruling in question until the
supervisory review proceedings had been completed.
Article 324 of the Code provided that the official
concerned should draft the application and forward it – in sufficient copies for
each of the parties – with the case file to the relevant court.
Article 325 read as follows:
'The parties ... shall be served copies of the
application. If circumstances so require, the parties ... shall be informed of
the time and place of the hearing.
The copies of the application shall be served on the
parties by the court [examining the application]. The court shall give the
parties sufficient time before the hearing to submit a written reply to the
application and any additional material.'
Under Article 328 of the Code, proceedings on an
application for supervisory review were normally oral and the parties were
invited to make comments once the judge concerned had reported to the court.
Courts hearing applications for supervisory review had
extensive jurisdiction in respect of final judgments:
Article 329
Powers of supervisory review courts
'The court that examines an application for supervisory
review may:
(1) uphold the judgment, decision or ruling and
dismiss the application;
(2) quash all or part of the judgment, decision
or ruling and order a fresh examination of the case at first or cassation
instance;
(3) quash all or part of the judgment, decision
or ruling and terminate the proceedings or leave the claim undecided;
(4) uphold any of the previous judgments,
decisions or rulings in the case;
(5) quash or vary the judgment of the court of
first or cassation instance or of a court that has carried out supervisory
review and deliver a new judgment without remitting the case for re-examination
if substantive laws have been erroneously construed and applied.'
The grounds for setting aside final judgments were as
follows:
Article 330
Grounds for setting aside judgments on supervisory review
'...
(1) wrongful application or interpretation of
substantive laws;
(2) significant breach of procedural rules which
led to the delivery of an unlawful judgment, decision or ruling ...'
There was no time-limit for lodging an application for
supervisory review, and, in principle, such applications could be lodged at any
time after a judgment had become final.”
THE LAW
1. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 § 1 OF
THE CONVENTION
21. The applicant company complained under Article 6 § 1
of the Convention that the decision of the Presidium of the Moscow City Court of
10 May 2001 had set aside the judgment in its favour by the Lyublinskiy District
Court of 17 May 2000. It also complained that the proceedings before the
Presidium of the Moscow City Court had been unfair in that the decision had been
taken in its absence and that it had not been afforded an opportunity to submit
observations in response to the prosecutor's request that the judgment be
quashed.
The relevant part of Article 6 § 1 reads as follows:
“In the determination of his civil rights and obligations
... everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing ... by [a] tribunal ...”
22. The Government stated that the Presidium of the
Moscow City Court had quashed the judgment in question and ordered a fresh
examination of the case because the substantive law had been wrongly applied and
there had been fundamental breaches of procedural law. That decision had
complied fully with Article 330 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
23. The applicant company maintained its complaint. It
submitted, inter alia,
that the proceedings before the Presidium of the Moscow City Court had not been
adversarial and that that court's decision had been in breach of the domestic
law.
A. Supervisory review procedure: substantive issues
24. The Court reiterates that the right to a fair
hearing before a tribunal as guaranteed by Article 6 § 1 of the Convention must
be interpreted in the light of the Preamble to the Convention, which, in its
relevant part, declares the rule of law to be part of the common heritage of the
Contracting States. One of the fundamental aspects of the rule of law is the
principle of legal certainty, which requires, among other things, that where the
courts have finally determined an issue, their ruling should not be called into
question (see
Brumărescu v. Romania [GC], no. 28342/95, § 61, ECHR 1999-VII).
25. Article 6 § 1 secures to everyone the right to have
any claim relating to his civil rights and obligations brought before a court or
tribunal. In this way it embodies the “right to a court”, of which the right of
access, that is the right to institute proceedings before courts in civil
matters, constitutes one aspect. However, that right would be illusory if a
Contracting State's domestic legal system allowed a final, binding judicial
decision to remain inoperative to the detriment of one party. It would be
inconceivable that Article 6 § 1 should describe in detail procedural guarantees
afforded to litigants – proceedings that are fair, public and expeditious –
without protecting the implementation of judicial decisions; to construe Article
6 as being concerned exclusively with access to a court and the conduct of
proceedings would be likely to lead to situations incompatible with the
principle of the rule of law which the Contracting States undertook to respect
when they ratified the Convention (see
Hornsby v. Greece,
judgment of 19 March 1997,
Reports
1997-II, pp. 510-11, § 40).
26. The Court has found a violation of the above
principle of legal certainty and of the right to a court in the case of
Ryabykh v. Russia,
where a final and binding judgment in the applicant's favour was set aside, on
the ground of misinterpretation of the law, by a higher court in supervisory
review proceedings following an application by a president of a regional court,
whose power to make such applications was not subject to any time-limit, so that
judgments were liable to challenge indefinitely (see
Ryabykh v. Russia,
cited above, §§ 51-58).
27. In the present case, the supervisory review of the
judgment of 17 May 2000, which had become final and binding under Article 208 of
the Code of Civil Procedure, was set in motion by the Moscow public prosecutor.
The latter was not a party to the proceedings. He enjoyed the power to intervene
by virtue of Articles 319 and 320 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and could
exercise it without any time-limit. By its decision of 10 May 2001, the
Presidium of the Moscow City Court quashed the judgment of 17 May 2000 and
ordered a fresh examination of the case, putting forward reasons which appear to
represent a view on the subject matter of the dispute which was not shared by
the other domestic courts involved in determining the case (see paragraphs 12,
18 and 19 above). It is true that as a result of the fresh examination of the
case the applicant's claims were granted by the judgment of the Commercial Court
of Moscow of 25 March 2003. However, the applicant had to endure legal
uncertainty for more than a year and ten months after the final judgment of 17
May 2000 was quashed.
28. The Court finds no reason to depart from its
judgment in the aforementioned
Ryabykh case.
It concludes that the setting aside of the judgment of 17 May 2000 in
supervisory review proceedings violated Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.
B. Supervisory review procedure: procedural issues
29. With regard to the complaint about the procedural
defects of the proceedings before the Presidium of the Moscow City Court, the
Court finds that, having concluded that there has been an infringement of the
applicant company's “right to a court” by the very use of the supervisory review
procedure, it is not necessary to consider whether the procedural guarantees of
Article 6 of the Convention were available in those proceedings (see
Ryabykh v. Russia,
cited above, § 59).
2. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE
CONVENTION
30. Article 41 of the Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a violation of
the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High
Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court
shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.”
31. The Court points out that under Rule 60 of the Rules
of Court any claim for just satisfaction must be submitted in writing together
with the relevant supporting documents or vouchers, “failing which the Chamber
may reject the claim in whole or in part”.
32. On 2 June 2004, after the present application had
been declared partly admissible, the Court invited the applicant company to
submit its claims for just satisfaction by 20 September 2004. No such claims
were submitted within the specified time-limit.
33. In these circumstances, the Court makes no award
under Article 41.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
1. Holds
that there has been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention;
2. Decides
to make no award under Article 41 of the Convention.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 21
July 2005, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Santiago
Quesada Christos
Rozakis
Deputy Registrar President
ROSELTRANS v. RUSSIA JUDGMENT
ROSELTRANS v. RUSSIA JUDGMENT
